We formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between time sequences of monetary outcomes. The model assumes that a decision maker uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision between some pairs of  options,while the other options are incomparable according to that criterion. When the first criterion is not decisive, the decision maker resorts to the second criterion to select an alternative.

This article provides an experimental analysis of attitude toward imprecise and variable information. Imprecise information is provided in the form of a set of possible probability values, such that it is virtually impossible for the subjects to guess or estimate, which one in the set is true or more likely to be true. We investigate how geometric features of such information pieces affect choices.

The response mode bias, in which subjects exhibit different risk attitudes when assessing certainty equivalents versus indifference probabilities, is awell-known phenomenon in the assessment of utility functions. In this empirical study, we develop and apply a cardinalmeasure of risk attitudes to analyze not only the existence, but also the strength of this phenomenon. Since probability levels involved in decision problems are already known to have a strong impact on behavior, we use this approach to study the impact of probabilities on the extent of the response mode bias.

The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga (Analysis 60:143–147, 2000) and Lewis (Analysis 61:171–176, 2001) differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank minded”, the ?rst interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent-minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.

A Collective Identity Function (CIF) is a rule which aggregates personal opinions on whether an individual belongs to a certain identity into a social decision. A simple CIF is one which can be expressed in terms of winning coalitions. We characterize simple CIFs and explore various CIFs of the literature by exploiting their ability of being expressed in terms of winning coalitions. We also use our setting to introduce conditions that ensure the equal treatment of individuals as voters or as outcomes.